Known malicious kitcriticalstealer

PhantomPolia: blockchain loader on compromised sites (ClickFix to Remus Stealer, and a checkout card skimmer)

family: phantompolia-sepolia-2026-10

Script injected into compromised websites, dressed up as a tag-manager snippet. It loads the ethers.js library, reads an encrypted value from a smart contract on the Ethereum Sepolia test network through public RPC nodes (EtherHiding: getText()), decrypts it into a host name and loads the next script from that host. The operator changes the host on-chain, and every infected site has its own contract, password and script path. The next stage is XOR-encrypted with a key derived from the infected site's own host name, so it only runs there. On some sites it is a ClickFix lure that asks Windows visitors to paste a PowerShell command, which downloads update.ps1 and installs the Remus infostealer (AutoIt loader, Donut shellcode). On online shops it is a card skimmer: it adds a fake card form styled for the shop's own payment method (card number, expiry, CVV) and sends what is typed to the operator. Seen on small WordPress and WooCommerce sites since at least August 2026; the contracts go back to March 2026. The ClickFix side is described publicly as PhantomPolia.

Anchors

YARA rulePhantomPolia_Sepolia_Loader
SMQL queryrun
yara_rule:PhantomPolia_Stage2_DomainLocked_Wrapper OR contacted_host:quietthistle.com OR contacted_host:velvetcairn.com OR contacted_host:ghostharvest.com OR contacted_host:stormwraith.com OR contacted_host:voidravenfortress.com OR contacted_host:bloodboundcitadel.top OR contacted_host:voderlence.com OR contacted_host:velnoderic.com OR contacted_host:nightflamevortex.top OR contacted_host:voidravenstorm.top OR contacted_host:ironphantomcore.top OR contacted_host:stormvenomforge.top OR contacted_host:shadowemberstrike.top

Provenance

Added: 2026-10-13 13:28
One hunt for the family. YARA anchor: the injected loader (ethers.js, the Sepolia RPC list, getText() and the PBKDF2 / AES-GCM decryption). Search anchor: the second rule, which matches the host-locked next-stage script, or pages that contacted a next-stage host the contracts have served: quietthistle[.]com, velvetcairn[.]com, ghostharvest[.]com, stormwraith[.]com, voidravenfortress[.]com, bloodboundcitadel[.]top (card skimmer, seen on infected shops), and voderlence[.]com, velnoderic[.]com, nightflamevortex[.]top, voidravenstorm[.]top, ironphantomcore[.]top, stormvenomforge[.]top, shadowemberstrike[.]top (ClickFix, from the public report). Two deployer wallets on Sepolia: 0x88361C914Bb0942da9a1b7Bb396a7513C1917aee (skimmer contracts, 182 since 2026-03-28) and 0x92F3f39c1CdE5EE705820af022e2b85C4EAa43F6 (ClickFix contracts, 30 since 2026-05-23). Early skimmer contracts stored the host unencrypted; those hosts follow a style<word>[.]com pattern. Most infected shops only load the skimmer form on the checkout page, so a sighting of the home page can look normal; the loader is the evidence.

Sightings (16)

HostScanScriptMatchWhen
marathonspiritueldefes.comc0467ac2…—query2026-10-13 13:33
voderlence.com40a839a0…—query2026-10-13 13:33
barcelonadrumfest.arte1da616f…—query2026-10-13 13:33
marathonspiritueldefes.com8dd25257…—query2026-10-13 13:33
casagrooming.com.cob2cc53c5…—query2026-10-13 13:33
voidravenstorm.top413a1690…—query2026-10-13 13:33
velvetcairn.com5b1ed607…—query2026-10-13 13:33
marinexperten.dkd7d5e8f8…—query2026-10-13 13:33
bloodboundcitadel.top0c9880e3…—query2026-10-13 13:33
nightflamevortex.top5b5ecd73…—query2026-10-13 13:33
galeriasultana.pl7149bc27…—query2026-10-13 13:33
voidravenfortress.com2ad01efe…—query2026-10-13 13:33
casagrooming.com.cob2cc53c5…https://casagrooming.com.co/#htmlyara2026-10-13 13:29
marathonspiritueldefes.com#html8dd25257…https://marathonspiritueldefes.com#htmlyara2026-10-13 13:29
marathonspiritueldefes.comc0467ac2…https://marathonspiritueldefes.com/#htmlyara2026-10-13 13:29
barcelonadrumfest.art#htmle1da616f…https://barcelonadrumfest.art#htmlyara2026-10-13 13:29