Known malicious kitcriticalother

Kimsuky "Operation GitPower": Korean insurance and contract lures, PDF-disguised shortcuts delivered from GitHub

family: kimsuky-gitpower-2026-10

Kimsuky's delivery of Windows shortcut (.lnk) malware to Korean targets through GitHub. Each repository holds one small ZIP named attachments_<Korean document name>.zip, such as an insurance claim (보험청구서), insurance papers (보험서류), an insurance policy (보험증권), a bond transfer contract (채권양도계약서) or a health check (건강검진). The ZIP contains a single shortcut with a PDF icon. Opening it runs a hidden PowerShell command carried as hex text. That command writes a second hex-encoded script to C:\Users\Public and schedules it to run every two minutes under an update-sounding task name (OneDriveUpdate…, MicrosoftEdgeUpdate…). It then opens a decoy PDF from a free-hosting site. The scheduled script polls a command server on free web hosting and runs whatever PowerShell it returns. A match means one of four things: a scan that downloaded one of these shortcuts (directly or inside the ZIP); a scan of a GitHub file with the campaign's path shape; a scan of a command-server request; or a scan of a decoy document with the campaign's file-name pattern.

Anchors

YARA ruleKimsuky_GitPower_LNK_Hex_Stager
SMQL queryrun
yara_rule:Kimsuky_GitPower_LNK_Hex_Stager OR (url:"raw.githubusercontent.com/" AND url:"/main/attachments_" AND url:".zip") OR url:"/setting.php?aaaaaa=" OR url:"/setting.php?banana=" OR url:"565978892140.pdf"

Provenance

Added: 2026-10-16 14:07
Content anchor: a YARA rule on the shortcut file itself. It matches the hex-in-hex PowerShell wrapper and the hex-encoded persistence the shortcut carries. It does not key on hosts, task names, variable names or command-server parameters, which change between waves. The rule requires the shortcut header at the very start of the file, so a web page or report that quotes the command cannot match. The search half tracks three URL shapes the operator has kept since September 2026: the delivery path raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/<account>/<random repository>/main/attachments_<name>.zip; the command-server request /setting.php?aaaaaa=… (/setting.php?banana=… in some waves); and decoy file names ending in 565978892140.pdf. Neither the command servers nor the decoy hosts are listed by name. The command servers sit on random subdomains of free web-hosting domains (onlinewebshop[.]net, mygamesonline[.]org, myartsonline[.]com and others), on one address shared with many unrelated sites. The decoys sit on free-hosting subdomains (lovestoblog[.]com, great-site[.]net, wuaze[.]com and others), and each wave brings new ones. The decoy PDFs are genuine public forms re-hosted by the operator, so their hashes are not tracked either. The GitHub accounts are new for each wave, and since October 2026 they have been registered with e-mail addresses on operator-owned domains such as insureall[.]online and hotelbook[.]world.

Sightings (5)

HostScanScriptMatchScanned
raw.githubusercontent.com4cbcfc28…—query2026-10-16 12:18
raw.githubusercontent.com8ae6eb2e…—query2026-10-16 10:47
raw.githubusercontent.comd2d3dbc1…—query2026-10-16 10:00
savelifeest.great-site.neted841a11…—query2026-10-16 10:00
crimaxies.lovestoblog.coma706715f…—query2026-10-16 10:00