Known malicious kitcriticalother

Falcon / PeckBirdy browser C2: implant script injected into compromised webmail and government sites

family: falcon-peckbirdy-browser-c2-2026-11

Falcon (also called XG) is a command-and-control framework that runs inside the visitor's browser; it is a variant of the PeckBirdy script framework. The operator adds one script tag to a site it has compromised, reported on webmail login pages (Roundcube) and on internal web applications of government bodies in the Middle East and South-East Asia between March and May 2026. The tag loads a per-visitor implant from the C2, for example hxxps://fonts.tarotfree101[.]top/config/config_<8 characters> or hxxps://fonts.chrorne[.]com/dist/js/12.<8 characters>.chunk.js. The C2 rebuilds the implant for every request with a new encoding key, so its hash never repeats. Once it runs, the implant keeps a visitor id disguised as a Baidu Analytics value (Hm_lvt_), opens an encrypted WebSocket to the C2 with a heartbeat every minute, and lets the operator run any JavaScript in the tab. Reported uses: harvesting user names and passwords as people sign in, showing selected users a fake Adobe Flash Player update that installs the Antino backdoor (from hxxps://microsoft-flash[.]com/download/), and getting a browser extension posing as a 'PDF Viewer' installed that copies cookies, saved passwords, clipboard contents and web traffic. PeckBirdy is still active: in November 2026 Chinese-language adult-video, comic, gambling and 'VPN accelerator' sites load its loader from hxxps://m.mod-js[.]org/js/<32 characters>. The loader looks up a DNS TXT record of xs.mmp-gep[.]org through public DNS-over-HTTPS resolvers, decodes the WebSocket C2 address from it (a1.mcp-source[.]online since June 2026), and runs whatever code the C2 sends back. The C2 hosts show a Tetris or Snake game to anyone who opens them directly. C2 hosts named in reports: fonts.tarotfree101[.]top, fonts.chrorne[.]com and robot.avbliud[.]com (Falcon); a1icdn[.]com, static.img-caches[.]com, app.css-alicdn[.]com, m.mod-js[.]org, m.as-cdn[.]org, static-resource[.]org, js.cache-cdn[.]org, kyo-cdn[.]com, os-js[.]com and ppcn-cdn[.]xyz (PeckBirdy); payload hosts microsoft-flash[.]com and wps-cn[.]com.

Anchors

Hunting ruleFalcon_Browser_C2_Implant
SMQL queryrun
yara_rule:Falcon_Implant_Injection_Tag OR contacted_host:fonts.tarotfree101.top OR contacted_host:fonts.chrorne.com OR contacted_host:robot.avbliud.com OR contacted_host:microsoft-flash.com OR contacted_host:www.microsoft-flash.com OR contacted_host:wps-cn.com OR contacted_host:www.wps-cn.com OR contacted_host:static.img-caches.com OR contacted_host:a1icdn.com OR contacted_host:app.css-alicdn.com OR contacted_host:m.mod-js.org OR contacted_host:m.as-cdn.org OR contacted_host:static-resource.org OR contacted_host:js.cache-cdn.org OR contacted_host:kyo-cdn.com OR contacted_host:os-js.com OR contacted_host:ppcn-cdn.xyz OR contacted_host:a1.mcp-source.online OR websocket_host:a1.mcp-source.online

Provenance

Added:
The main hunting rule keys on the implant's own code, not on a host name: the framework code (the Hm_lvt_ visitor id together with the C2 configuration names and its key-exchange and labelling messages) the two known shapes of the per-visitor encoding wrapper, and the PeckBirdy loader's own code (its DNS-over-HTTPS lookup and decoding key). It therefore finds the implant on a C2 host that no report has named yet. A second rule finds the injected script tag itself (a script loaded from /config/config_<8 characters> on another host), so a compromised page is found even after its C2 has gone offline. The search adds the reported C2 and payload hosts. A site that shows this hunt is a compromised site, not the attacker's own: its operators should remove the injected tag from their templates and headers, reset the passwords of everyone who signed in while it was present, and check users' browsers for a 'PDF Viewer' extension installed in developer mode.

Sightings (8)Atom feed

HostScanScriptMatchScanned
os-js.com2a63e468…—query2026-09-16 08:47 UTC
a8ciqsw.topf4ab26b5…—query2025-11-02 17:05 UTC
ll3ttgq.top065c73d1…—query2025-10-26 02:24 UTC
ll3ttgq.top173f782e…—query2025-10-24 10:25 UTC
e8zc7guj9j.com3ee5325f…—query2025-10-16 11:44 UTC
hqjaeg5trm.com1795b6c6…—query2025-10-14 08:57 UTC
zzzmu4j9.top08aa1da7…—query2025-10-14 05:12 UTC
t4vjyksp.top4ce02414…—query2025-10-14 03:24 UTC