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Within the .cd country-code top-level domain, 'vd.cc.cd' is registered, featuring subdomain 'vd'. Its registrable label 'cc' stretches across 2 characters with zero vowels and 2 consonants. Tokenizing the label suggests one word: cc. The median word length lands at 2 characters. No strong language cues emerged from the frequency lists.

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DOMPurify allows tampering by prototype pollution

DOMPurify allows Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

When USE_PROFILES is enabled, DOMPurify rebuilds ALLOWED_ATTR as a plain array whose properties are looked up by name, making it susceptible to prototype pollution. If Array.prototype has been polluted with an event handler attribute name (e.g. onclick), DOMPurify will allow that event handler to survive sanitization, resulting in DOM-based XSS.

DOMPurify's ADD_ATTR predicate function mechanism (via EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck) short-circuits URI validation when the predicate returns true. This allows unsafe protocols such as javascript: to survive sanitization in href and similar attributes, enabling DOM-based XSS when such links are activated.

DOMPurify is vulnerable to mutation-XSS (mXSS) when sanitized HTML is embedded into special raw-text wrapper elements such as xmp, script, iframe, noembed, noframes, or noscript before being assigned via innerHTML. Attacker-controlled sequences like </xmp> inside attribute values close the raw-text context during the second parse, causing the sanitized output to mutate into executable markup.

DOMPurify has a logic inconsistency where FORBID_TAGS is not checked when a function-based ADD_TAGS (tagCheck) returns true. Due to short-circuit evaluation, the FORBID_TAGS check is never evaluated, allowing explicitly forbidden elements to pass through sanitization when EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck is configured.

DOMPurify has an asymmetric security inconsistency where FORBID_TAGS does not win over a function-based ADD_TAGS predicate, while FORBID_ATTR correctly wins over ADD_ATTR. When ADD_TAGS is provided as a function that returns true, explicitly forbidden tags such as iframe and form pass through sanitization with their attributes intact.

DOMPurify's SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES feature fails to strip Mustache/template expressions when RETURN_DOM or RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT is used. The final string-scrubbing pass that removes expressions like {{...}} is skipped in DOM-return mode, and split text nodes (e.g. from removed intermediate tags) can rejoin to form a complete expression that template-evaluating frameworks like Vue 2 will execute.

DOMPurify versions 3.0.1 through 3.3.3 are vulnerable to an XSS bypass via prototype pollution. When no CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING is specified, the fallback plain object inherits from Object.prototype; if an attacker has polluted Object.prototype.tagNameCheck and Object.prototype.attributeNameCheck with permissive regexes, DOMPurify allows arbitrary custom elements with event handler attributes through sanitization.

DOMPurify: Cross-realm IN_PLACE sanitization leaves executable markup intact via realm-bound `instanceof` checks

DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM

DOMPurify: Hook mutation of `data.allowedTags` / `data.allowedAttributes` permanently pollutes `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS` / `DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR`

DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content

DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects

DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes

DOMPurify: Trusted Types policy survives `clearConfig()` and can poison later `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output

DOMPurify: Permanent `ALLOWED_ATTR` pollution via `setConfig()` bypassing the hook clone-guard (incomplete fix of the 3.4.7 hook-pollution patch)

DOMPurify: `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` bypasses `afterSanitizeElements` for allowed custom elements.

DOMPurify: IN_PLACE hook removal leaves a detached subtree executable, causing XSS

DOMPurify: IN_PLACE returns a force-removed rawtext root whose text carries attacker markup — pure HTML reparse executes

DOMPurify: SMIL attributeName=href guard is skipped when PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE is application/xhtml+xml

DOMPurify IN_PLACE: hook that removes a parent or sibling leaves the detached subtree's event handlers armed (incomplete fix for GHSA-p98j-92pf-mc4p)

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width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, viewport-fit=cover, interactive-widget=resizes-content

viewport

theme-color

format-detection

mobile-web-app-capable

apple-mobile-web-app-capable

apple-mobile-web-app-status-bar-style

apple-mobile-web-app-title

HSTS header missing - vulnerable to protocol downgrade attacks

CSP header missing - vulnerable to XSS attacks

cc.cd

VH Global Limited

VH-GLOBAL-2


        (function () {
            var initialPage = String(window.location.hash || '').replace(/^#/, '').split('?')[0];
            if (initialPage && initialPage !== 'dashboard') {
                document.documentElement.classList.add('initial-route-pending');
            }
        })();
    


        
        if (typeof ELK === 'undefined' && typeof elk !== 'undefined') {
            window.ELK = elk;
        }
    

Requests	IP Address	Location	AS Autonomous System
60	155.103.157.31	United States	AS42960VH Global Limited
60	1	-	-

Security Scan Report: vd.cc.cd

Summary

AI Security Verdict

High Risk

Details

Screenshot

Page Load Overview

Language Analysis

Primary Language

Detection Details

Website Classification

Primary Category

All Detected Categories

Detected Features

Domain & IP Information

Detected Technologies2

Content Similarity HashesFor malware variant detection

TLSH (Trend Micro Locality Sensitive Hash)

ssdeep (Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing)

sdhash (Similarity Digest Hashing)

Image Hashes

Perceptual Hashes

Other Hashes

Scan History