Known malicious kitcriticalphishing

ClickFix cache smuggling: Run-dialog command that runs a payload hidden in the browser cache — page code

family: clickfix-cache-smuggling-2026-10

Fake verification overlays on compromised websites (a Cloudflare-style 'Verifying…' box that tells the visitor to press Windows key + R, paste with Ctrl+V and press Enter) whose copied command contains no web address. Before the visitor does anything, the page loads the real payload, a VBScript or batch file, as if it were an image, so the browser stores it in its cache. The pasted cmd.exe one-liner walks the browser profile folder (for /r over %LOCALAPPDATA%), picks the cached file by its exact size (if %~zf==33433) or by a marker string inside it (findstr /m /c:), copies it to %TEMP% under a script name such as t.vbs or t.cmd, and runs it. Reported by Microsoft Threat Intelligence on 2026-10-03: the VBScript fetches a PowerShell stage from cocojambo[.]us[.]com, which leads to credential theft and a Python backdoor contacting capsysnet[.]vg and ciliabula[.]cc. Expel and Crimson7 described the same technique earlier. No legitimate verification step asks visitors to run a command.

Anchors

YARA ruleClickFix_Browser_Cache_Smuggling_Command

Provenance

Added: 2026-10-04 13:07
Page rule: matches a page or script that holds the command's structure (the recursive walk over a user profile folder, the size or marker check, and the copy into the temporary folder under a script or image name) together with code that writes to the clipboard. It does not depend on brand names, hostnames or the payload size, which changes between variants. A command that is base64-encoded or assembled at run time does not match. An article that quotes the command next to a copy-to-clipboard button can match. The same first step, finding a cached image by its exact size in the browser's f_ cache files, is documented for the DOUBLECUP ClickFix delivery service (SOCRadar, August 2026). DOUBLECUP pulls a marked script out of the cached image instead of copying the whole file, so that form needs a different rule. Microsoft has not named the operator. The later stages and one server share traits with CountLoader, the loader DOUBLECUP is reported to deliver; that is an overlap, not a confirmed attribution.

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